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Abstract
We analyze local content requirement (LCR) and tariﬀ in a two-country model
of vertical market-structure with endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). The
foreign ﬁrm chooses whether to export or to undertake FDI. The host country antic-
ipates the potential for FDI and selects tariﬀ with or without LCR rate accordingly.
Without LCR, the FDI imposes a threat on the host country and the threat exerts
a tariﬀ-liberalizing pressure. This FDI is often coined as quid-pro-quo FDI in the
literature. In contrast, we show that with LCR the host government can defuse the
threat of quid-pro-quo FDI.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Bhagwati, et.al. (1987), in a seminal paper, demonstrated that ﬁrms may undertake
foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to by-pass tariﬀ imposed by a host country on
their exports and to further exert liberalizing pressure on the host country’s trade barriers.
This kind of FDI is usually coined as quid-pro-quo FDI. Due to the trade-liberalizing
pressure of this FDI, the host country may impose a combination of an optimal tariﬀ and
an optimal tax (subsidy) on capital exports (Bhagwati, et.al. (1987)) or alternatively it
may prefer to use voluntary export restraints (VERs) instead of tariﬀ (Konishi, Saggi,
and Weber (1999)).
This paper delves further into the issue of quid-pro-quo FDI using a simple two-country
model of vertical market-structure with an endogenous FDI. In the model, the foreign
ﬁrm chooses whether to export or to undertake FDI. Suppose that a host country prefers
the foreign ﬁrm to choose export to FDI as an entry mode, then it follows that a mere
threat of having an inward FDI establishment by the foreign ﬁrm could indeed exert a
credible pressure on the host country to liberalize its trade barrier.1
Rather than bending to the liberalizing pressure of the FDI threat, the host country
can undertake a diﬀerent policy approach. It can implement a policy that induces an
unfavorable environment for FDI. Such a policy will render FDI less attractive than export
for the foreign ﬁrm. This paper suggests that it can be done by implementing a local
content requirement (LCR) policy. A tougher LCR policy makes export increasingly more
attractive than FDI as an entry mode for the foreign downstream ﬁrm. Consequently,
the host country is able to defuse the threat of quid-pro-quo FDI without necessarily
embarking in any unilateral trade liberalization. Thus in this sense, an LCR policy helps
the host country to sustain protectionism.
To the best of our knowledge, such an insight on the role of LCR in defusing the
threat of quid-pro-quo FDI is novel in the literature. Usually, an LCR policy is analyzed
in a framework in which foreign ﬁrms have already chosen FDI as an entry mode and face
the LCR policy.2 It does not allow us to analyze the incentive of foreign ﬁrms to choose
FDI instead of export as an entry mode in the ﬁrst place. Naturally if the level of LCR
is excessively high, these foreign ﬁrms will not enter. Indeed, the empirical evidence on
1In the literature, the physical presence of FDI is needed in order to exert a credible pressure on
the host country to liberalize its trade. In contrast, this paper shows that such a credible pressure can
already be induced by the existence of a potential FDI establishment.
2See among others Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967), Corden (1971), Grossman (1981), Krishna
and Itoh (1988), Vousden (1987), Hollander (1987), Davidson, et.al. (1987), Richardson (1991), and
Belderbos and Sleuwagen (1997).
2foreign ﬁrms’ incentive to enter as an FDI in a host country in the presence of the host
country’s LCR policy conﬁrms this.3
Lahiri and Ono (1998) and Qiu and Tao (2001) are perhaps exceptions, as they do
investigate the choice of foreign ﬁrms’ entry mode in the presence of tariﬀ and LCR.
However, their paper does not consider set-up costs as a barrier to entry. On the contrary,
this present paper argues that set-up costs should play a crucial role for the foreign ﬁrms’
entry decision4, and hence should be explicitly incorporated in the analysis. Furthermore
and most importantly, their paper does not analyze the relationship between LCR and
quid-pro-quo FDI.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model setting and its solutions.
Section 3 examines the role of set-up costs and LCR policy in defusing the threat of
quid-pro-quo FDI. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model Setting
There are two countries, i.e. the home country (h) and the foreign country (f). In each
country, there is a downstream ﬁrm (d) which produces a homogenous ﬁnal goods, and
an upstream ﬁrm (u), which produces a homogenous input goods that is utilized in the
production of the ﬁnal goods. For simplicity, we assume that there is no ﬁnal goods
market in the foreign country. This implies that the home and foreign downstream ﬁrms
are only competing in the home country. The home market demand for the ﬁnal goods
i sa s s u m e dt ob el i n e a ri nt h ef o r mo fP =1−Q =1−(qh
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d denote respectively the price, total aggregate quantities, and quantities produced by
t h eh o m ea n df o r e i g nd o w n s t r e a mﬁrms.
We assume that the two competing downstream ﬁrms have the same production tech-
nology. One unit of the input goods is needed to produce one unit of the ﬁnal goods.
Before competing in the home country’s ﬁnal goods market, the foreign downstream ﬁrm
must decide whether to export the ﬁnal goods into the home market or to enter the home
market directly. If the foreign ﬁrm chooses the former, it has to pay a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, τ,
per unit of exports. However, if it chooses the latter, it has to pay set-up costs (S)a n d
comply with the host country’s policy on LCR (α), which stipulates the required ratio
3See among others Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) and Lopez-da-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford
(1996). They ﬁnd that local content provisions discourage foreign ﬁrms from producing inside.
4Indeed, an empirical study conducted by Moran (1992) ﬁnds that ﬁrms are often reluctant to move
production to a country even if the rate of LCR is suﬃciently low. Markusen and Venables (1995) argue
that this empirical result points to the importance of entry costs. See also Brainard (1993) for the
importance of ﬁxed costs as a barrier to entry.
3of local input contents to the total input contents that the foreign downstream ﬁrm must
use in the production.5
Let qh
u and qf
u denote the amount of input used by, respectively, the home and the
foreign downstream ﬁrms. If the LCR policy is imposed, αqf
u represents the amount of
local input that the foreign downstream ﬁrm is obliged to use, and (1 − α)qf
u represents
the amount of input that is allowed to be imported from its own country without duties.6






We assume that foreign ﬁrms are vertically integrated, while domestic ﬁrms are ver-
tically separated. This essentially implies that the foreign upstream ﬁrm sells input to
the foreign downstream ﬁrm at the prevailing internal transfer price, which is assumed
to be equal to the marginal cost of producing input (c). For the sake of simplicity and
without loss of generality, we assume that the marginal cost of producing input for both
upstream ﬁrms is zero. The domestic downstream ﬁrm, on the contrary, must buy the
required input from the domestic upstream ﬁrm at a market price (ph
u). As the domestic
input price is higher than the foreign internal input price, there is no incentive for the
foreign downstream ﬁrm to buy input from the domestic upstream ﬁrm in the absence
of an LCR policy. Furthermore, as foreign ﬁrms are vertically integrated and the for-
eign downstream ﬁrm competes with the domestic downstream ﬁrm in the home market,
there is no incentive for the foreign upstream ﬁrm to supply input to its downstream
competitor. Thus, input markets are eﬀectively segmented. It is also obvious that when
the foreign downstream ﬁrm chooses to enter the home market using FDI, there is no
i n c e n t i v ef o rt h ef o r e i g nﬁrm to deliberately exceed the stipulated LCR rate. This setting
thus allows us to get a clearer picture on the eﬀect of an LCR policy.
The timing sequence of the model is as follows. In stage 1, the home government
sets tariﬀ and LCR. In stage 2, the foreign downstream ﬁrm decides its entry mode,
i.e., exporting to the home market or setting up a ﬁr mi nt h eh o m em a r k e t .I ns t a g e3 ,
the foreign input producer supplies input to the foreign downstream ﬁrm and charges an
internal transfer price which is equal to the marginal cost of producing input. Meanwhile,
the home input producer observes the demand for input from the domestic downstream
5Grossman (1981) deﬁnes an LCR in both the physical and value terms. In this paper, and also in
Lahiri and Ono (1998) and Qiu and Tao (2001), we deﬁne an LCR in the physical term.
6Qiu and Tao (2001) mention that when an LCR is imposed, then typically, in practice, there is a
penality imposed, in the form of tariﬀ duties, on a country that cannot satisfy the minimum level of the
LCR. If the LCR policy is abided by, then there will be no tariﬀ duties imposed. In addition, Veloso
(2001) shows that LCR policy is weakly preferred to a tariﬀ.I nl i n ew i t ht h e s et w of a c t o r s ,w ea s s u m e
that there is no tariﬀ imposed on the import of input done by the subsidiary of the foreign downstream
ﬁrm.
4ﬁrm and maximizes its proﬁts by setting an optimal input price. Finally, in stage 4, the
home and foreign downstream producers engage in Cournot competition. We solve this
game by backward induction.
2.1 Downstream Cournot Competition
There are two possible cases depending on the entry mode chosen by the foreign down-
stream ﬁrm. The ﬁrst case is the export case, while the second case is the FDI case.
2.1.1 Export Mode





























Both ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion.The following Cournot-Nash equilibrium quanti-
ties can be straightforwardly derived. Recall that we have pf






































To establish a foreign direct subsidiary, the foreign ﬁrm must incur set-up costs (S). In
addition, it is also required to comply with the LCR policy (α)a d o p t e db yt h eh o s t
country’s government. The home and foreign downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁt function can then






























d − S (7)































The ﬁnal goods’s price in the home market can be expressed as,
P =




2.2 Upstream Monopolists’ Decision
Similarly, there are two possible cases depending on the entry mode chosen by the foreign
downstream ﬁrm.
2.2.1 Export Mode











It is obvious that the foreign upstream ﬁrm’s earns zero proﬁt as it sells input at
marginal cost to its downstream ﬁrm subsidiary. On the contrary, the domestic upstream
ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts because it sells input to the vertically-separated domestic down-
stream ﬁrm at a market price.
The assumption of ‘one-to-one’ production technology implies that the domestic down-
stream ﬁrm’s optimal output acts as the domestic upstream ﬁrm’s derived-demand for








Upon substituting this derived demand into the domestic upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁtf u n c t i o n







The optimal quantity of input (qf










6We require τ ≤ 5
7 to have qf
u ≥ 0.

























The domestic upstream ﬁrm supplies both the domestic downstream ﬁrm and also the
foreign downstream ﬁrm. This is because the foreign downstream subsidiary must abide
by the LCR policy, and thus must buy a certain fraction of its input needs (α)f r o mt h e











2α2 − 2α +2
Given this derived demand for input, the optimal quantities of input supplied by the
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4α2 − 4α − 4
(21)
2.3 Foreign Downstream Firm’s Choice of Entry Mode










7Using all solutions derived previously, we can express the foreign downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt
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∂α < 0 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1). The optimal α for the ﬁrm is α =0 , which implies
that the ﬁrm will never have an incentive to exceed the stipulated LCR level.





d(α). Otherwise, the opposite prevails. The set of tariﬀ (τ)a n d
LCR (α) policy combinations that makes the foreign ﬁrm indiﬀerent between the two




d(α). Figure 1 depicts this set of
policy combinations, which we call the proﬁt equivalence curve (PEC), for the case of
S =0and S =0 .024.
[ENTER FIGURE 1 HERE]




d(α), which implies that
the foreign downstream ﬁrm prefers FDI to export. Likewise, all policy combinations




d(α), which implies that the foreign downstream
ﬁrm prefers export to FDI.
2.4 Home Country ’s Choice of Policy
In stage 1, the home country’s objective is to maximize its welfare by choosing an op-
timal tariﬀ or LCR rate.7 The welfare consists of consumers’ surplus, upstream and
downstream producers’ surplus, and the tariﬀ revenue (under the export mode). The








In which W h (τ) and W h (α) denote, respectively, the domestic welfare under the export
mode and the FDI mode. They can be straightforwardly expressed as,









96α2 − 76α3 − 56α +3 7 α4 +2 3
96(1 − α + α2)
2 (27)
The following lemma applies.
Lemma 1 (i) The optimal tariﬀ rate that will be imposed by the domestic government if
the foreign ﬁrm is expected to choose export as an entry mode is τo =0 .37. (ii) The
optimal LCR rate that will be imposed by the domestic government if the foreign
ﬁrm is expected to choose FDI as an entry mode is αo =1 . (iii) Given the optimal
tariﬀ and LCR level, the home country’s welfare in the case of export is higher than
that in the case of FDI (W h(τo) >W h(αo)).
Proof. This is trivial from the comparison of (26) and (27).
Figure 2 veriﬁes point (iii) of the above lemma. The domestic country’s welfare under
the export mode is indeed higher than that under the FDI mode. Obviously, the domestic
country would like to induce the foreign country to export rather than to undertake FDI.8
This result is similar to Motta (1992), who shows that there will be a rise in the ineﬃcient
production and a loss in the tariﬀ revenue that will lead to a welfare reduction when an
optimal tariﬀ is imposed and an FDI takes place.
[ENTER FIGURE 2 HERE]
From our earlier discussion, the foreign downstream ﬁrm may choose either export
or FDI as an entry mode depending on the parameter values of the model. Meanwhile,
from our welfare analysis, the domestic government prefers export to FDI as an entry
mode. This implies that there is potentially a conﬂict of entry-mode preference between
the foreign ﬁrm and the domestic government. Our next section discusses this aspect in
details.
3 The Role of LCR in Defusing the Threat of ‘Quid-
Pro-Quo’ FDI
For the purpose of our analysis in this section, we deﬁne the welfare equivalence curve
( W E C )a st h es e to ft a r i ﬀ (τ)a n dL C Rr a t e( α) that makes the host government indiﬀer-
ent between the two entry modes that might be chosen by the foreign downstream ﬁrm;
8It should be noted that in this model we do not take into account other positive beneﬁts that may
be accrued from having an FDI, such as an increase in the employment rate and a technology transfer.
9W h (τ)=W h(α). The area above and below the WEC represents, respectively, the case
of Wh (τ) >Wh (α) and W h (τ) <W h (α).
Figure 3 below combines the PEC and WEC together. It is obvious that under
some circumstances there will be a conﬂict of entry-mode preference between the home
government and the foreign ﬁrm. For instance, policy combinations above the PEC will
induce the foreign ﬁrm to undertake FDI, however the home government will prefer the
foreign ﬁrm to choose export. On the contrary, policy combinations below the WEC will
induce the foreign ﬁrm to choose export, however the home government will prefer the
foreign ﬁrm to choose FDI. The only policy combinations that do not lead to a conﬂict
of entry-mode preference are those located in between the PEC and WEC. Here, both
parties would prefer to have export to FDI as an entry mode.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Suppose that initially the host country’s government only sets an optimal tariﬀ (τo =
0.37) and does not impose any LCR policy (α =0 ) . In addition, let us also assume
that S =0 . Under this setting, it can be veriﬁed that the foreign downstream ﬁrm
prefers to choose FDI to export as an entry mode. On the contrary, the host government
prefers to have export to FDI as the foreign downstream ﬁrm’s entry mode. In ﬁgure
3, this combination of policies (τo =0 .37 and α =0 ) is located in the area above the
PEC and the WEC. In order to eliminate the conﬂict of entry-mode preference, the host
government must induce the foreign ﬁrm to choose export as an entry mode. However,
if the LCR policy is not available at the government’s disposal, the only way that the
government can do is to unilaterally liberalize its tariﬀ.I ti so b v i o u sf r o mﬁgure 3 that
in this case, the host government must go all the way to free trade (τ =0 ).
In this sense, the threat of FDI forces the host country to unilaterally liberalize its
tariﬀ protection. This is reminiscent to the seminal idea of quid-pro-quo FDI pioneered
by Bhagwati, et al. (1987), which examines the power of FDI in exerting a liberalizing
pressure on the potential host government’s trade protection. The framework that is used
in the analysis of the quid pro quo FDI is usually a two period framework. In the ﬁrst
period an FDI is implemented, and then in the second period the existence of FDI will
exert pressure on the host country to liberalize its trade. The trade liberalization could
take several forms such as, an optimal tax (subsidy) on capital exports as in Bhagwati,
et al. (1987), or the use of voluntary export restraints (VERs) rather than tariﬀ as in
Konishi, Saggi, and Weber (1999). In all of these quid-pro-quo FDI studies, the physical
presence of an FDI is required in order to create the liberalizing pressure. In contrast,
10our paper shows that the mere threat of an FDI establishment is enough to exert that
liberalizing pressure.
Now, given that τo =0 .37 and α =0 , let us assume that there are set-up costs, i.e.
S =0 .024. The presence of set-up costs will shift the PEC upward. As a result, the
area located in between the PEC and WEC becomes wider (see ﬁgure 4). It implies that
there will be more policy combinations that do not result in a conﬂict of entry-mode
preference. This is because the relative attractiveness of FDI to export as an entry mode
diminishes. This also implies that the home country’s government is able to reduce the
extent of tariﬀ liberalizing pressure. It is easy to derive that when we have S =0 .024,
the required tariﬀ level to avoid the conﬂict of preference is τ =0 .05 (point A in ﬁgure
4).9 It is obvious that the required level of tariﬀ reduction from the optimal tariﬀ rate
is more stringent in the case of S =0than in the case of S =0 .024. In the former, the
host government has to go all the way to free trade (τ =0 ), while in the latter, the host
government can still maintain a little bit of tariﬀ protection by setting τ =0 .05.I nt h i s
sense, the presence of set-up costs can partly defuse the threat of FDI.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
As an alternative to set-up costs, the host country can also defuse the threat of quid-
pro-quo FDI using an LCR policy. To see this, let us suppose that the host government
imposes α =0 .5. Meanwhile, we still keep τo =0 .37 and S =0 .024. It can be easily
veriﬁed that with this level of LCR, the host government needs only to set τ =0 .20
(point B in ﬁgure 4) in order to avoid a conﬂict of preference. This implies that imposing
an LCR policy increases the host government’s ability to maintain its tariﬀ protection.
This is because the host government needs only to reduce its optimal tariﬀ level by
approximately 43%. As a comparison, if the government imposes no LCR policy, it must
reduce its optimal tariﬀ level by approximately 86%.
Now, if the domestic government is able to set an optimal LCR level to maximize
i t sw e l f a r e ,i tw i l ls e tαo =1(see lemma 1). Given the optimal tariﬀ level (τo), setting
αo =1brings us to point C in ﬁgure 4. It is immediately apparent that with αo =1 ,t h e
domestic government needs not to unilaterally liberalize its tariﬀ.I t c a n s t i l l k e e p t h e
optimal tariﬀ level τo =0 .37 intact.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 All in all, our model points to the following results.




d(α).T h e nw ed e r i v e
the value of τ that will satisfy the above expression.
11(i) The presence of set-up costs diminishes the relative attractiveness of FDI to
export as an entry mode for the foreign downstream ﬁrm. In this respect, the
presence of set-up costs defuses the threat of quid-pro-quo FDI.
(ii) In the absence of an LCR policy and when set-up costs are not excessively high,
the host country’s government must unilaterally liberalize its tariﬀ in order to
defuse the threat of FDI.
(iii) In the presence of an LCR policy, the extent of unilateral tariﬀ liberalization
depends on the size of the LCR rate. A higher LCR rate implies a less stringent
need to unilaterally liberalize the tariﬀ.
(iv) When the LCR rate is set optimally (αo =1 ), there is no need for the host
country’s government to unilaterally reduce its tariﬀ. It can still keep imposing
the optimal tariﬀ level (τo =0 .37). In this respect, the presence of an optimal
LCR policy completely eliminates the threat of a quid-pro-quo FDI.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We explore, in a simple model of vertical structure, the relationships between a host
country’s endogenous choice of trade and investment policies and a foreign multinational
ﬁrm’s endogenous choice of entry mode.
We ﬁnd that under some circumstances there might be a conﬂict of entry mode pref-
erence between the host country and the foreign downstream ﬁrm. The foreign ﬁrm
prefers to choose FDI as an entry mode, while the host government prefers the foreign
ﬁrm to choose export since the host country’s welfare is higher under the export mode
than under the FDI mode. As a result of this conﬂicting preference, the foreign ﬁrm can
use FDI to exert a liberalizing pressure on the home country’s tariﬀ barrier. This idea is
reminiscent to the concept of quid-pro-quo FDI pioneered by Bhagwati, et al (1987). This
type of FDI induces the host country to unilaterally liberalize its tariﬀ in order to defuse
the threat of FDI. However, in the presence of an optimal LCR policy, it is not necessary
for the host country to unilaterally liberalize its tariﬀ in order to defuse the quid-pro-quo
FDI. In this sense, the LCR policy can actually be used to sustain protectionism.
Given the nature of the LCR policy shown above, it is interesting to extend this
paper to analyse the current WTO’s rule on the LCR policy. In recent years, the WTO
has also incorporated trade related investment measures (TRIMs), including LCR, in its
regulatory framework. The main purpose of this inclusion is to encourage countries to
12further open up their markets to foreign ﬁrms. It is stipulated that an adoption of an
LCR policy by a Member country on FDIs is deemed illegal (see Article III:4 of GATT).
In the context of our paper, it is interesting to investigate whether or not LCR should be
deemed illegal from the viewpoint of multilateral trade (tariﬀ) liberalization. We leave
this issue for our future research.
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Figure 4: The Conﬂict of Preference (S =0 .024)
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